We propose a fully homomorphic encryption scheme -i.e., a scheme that allows one to evaluate circuits over encrypted data without being able to decrypt. Our solution comes in three steps. First, we provide a general result -that, to construct an encryption scheme that permits evaluation of arbitrary circuits, it suffices to construct an encryption scheme that can evaluate (slightly augmented versions of) its own decryption circuit; we call a scheme that can evaluate its (augmented) decryption circuit bootstrappable.
INTRODUCTION
We propose a solution to the old open problem of constructing a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. This notion, originally called a privacy homomorphism, was introPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. duced by Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [54] shortly after the invention of RSA by Rivest, Adleman and Shamir [55] . Basic RSA is a multiplicatively homomorphic encryption scheme -i.e., given RSA public key pk = (N, e) and ciphertexts {ψi ← π e i mod N }, one can efficiently compute i ψi = ( i πi) e mod N , a ciphertext that encrypts the product of the original plaintexts. Rivest et al. [54] asked a natural question: What can one do with an encryption scheme that is fully homomorphic: a scheme E with an efficient algorithm EvaluateE that, for any valid public key pk, any circuit C (not just a circuit consisting of multiplication gates), and any ciphertexts ψi ← Encrypt E (pk, πi), outputs ψ ← EvaluateE (pk, C, ψ1, . . . , ψt) , a valid encryption of C(π1, . . . , πt) under pk? Their answer: one can arbitrarily compute on encrypted data -i.e., one can process encrypted data (query it, write into it, do anything to it that can be efficiently expressed as a circuit) without the decryption key. As an application, they suggested private data banks: a user can store its data on an untrusted server in encrypted form, yet still allow the server to process, and respond to, the user's data queries (with responses more concise than the trivial solution: the server just sends all of the encrypted data back to the user to process). Since then, cryptographers have accumulated a list of "killer" applications for fully homomorphic encryption. However, prior to this proposal, we did not have a viable construction.
Homomorphic Encryption
A homomorphic public key encryption scheme E has four algorithms KeyGen E , Encrypt E , Decrypt E , and an additional algorithm EvaluateE that takes as input the public key pk, a circuit C from a permitted set CE of circuits, and a tuple of ciphertexts Ψ = ψ1, . . . , ψt ; it outputs a ciphertext ψ. The computational complexity of all of these algorithms must be polynomial in security parameter λ and (in the case of EvaluateE ) the size of C. E is correct for circuits in CE if, for any key-pair (sk, pk) output by KeyGen E (λ), any circuit C ∈ CE , any plaintexts π1, . . . , πt, and any ciphertexts Ψ = ψ1, . . . , ψt with ψi ← Encrypt E (pk, πi), it is the case that:
ψ ← EvaluateE (pk, C, Ψ) ⇒ C(π1, . . . , πt) = Decrypt E (sk, ψ) By itself, mere correctness does not exclude trivial schemes. So, we require ciphertext size and decryption time to be up- 1 In particular, we could define EvaluateE (pk, C, Ψ) to just output (C, Ψ) without "processing" the circuit or ciphertexts at all, and Decrypt E to decrypt the component ciphertexts and apply C to results.
per bounded by a function of the security parameter λ, independently of C (or perhaps, as a relaxation, dependent on the depth of C, but not the size).
Definition 1 (Homomorphic Encryption
. E is homomorphic for circuits in CE if E is correct for CE and Decrypt E can be expressed as a circuit DE of size poly(λ).
Definition 2 (Fully Homomorphic Encryption).
E is fully homomorphic if it is homomorphic for all circuits.
Definition 3 (Leveled Fully Hom. Encryption).
A family of schemes {E (d) : d ∈ Z + } is leveled fully homomorphic if they all use the same decryption circuit, E (d) is homomorphic for all circuits of depth at most d (that use some specified set of gates Γ), and the computational complexity of E (d) 's algorithms is polynomial in λ, d, and (in the case of Evaluate E (d) ) the size of C. Remark 1. One may desire -e.g., for the two-party computation setting -the additional property that Encrypt E and EvaluateE have the same output distribution, or that there is at least some post-hoc randomization procedure that induces the same output distribution. We discuss such circuit privacy in Section 7.
Here, we focus on constructing a scheme that is semantically secure against chosen plaintext attacks (or just "semantically secure"). Unfortunately a scheme that has nontrivial homomorphisms cannot be semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA2), since it is malleable. There are relaxed notions of CCA2 security [3, 16, 52] , but they do not apply to a fully homomorphic scheme. However, constructing a CCA1-secure fully homomorphic encryption scheme is an interesting open problem.
Our Results
We construct a fully homomorphic encryption scheme using ideal lattices. The result can roughly be broken down into three steps: a general "bootstrapping" result, an "initial construction" using ideal lattices, and a technique to "squash the decryption circuit" to permit bootstrapping.
Our research began with the second step: a PKE scheme E1 described in Section 3 that uses ideal lattices and is homomorphic for shallow circuits. A ciphertext ψ has the form v + x where v is in the ideal lattice and x is an "error" or "offset" vector that encodes the plaintext π. Interpreting ciphertext vectors as coefficient vectors of elements in a polynomial ring Z[x]/f (x), we add and multiply ciphertexts using ring operations -ψ ← ψ1 + ψ2 or ψ ← ψ1 × ψ2 -and induce addition and multiplication of the underlying plaintexts. By itself, this scheme improves upon prior work. It compares favorably to Boneh-Goh-Nissim [11] ; it is homomorphic for circuits with greater multiplicative depth while allowing essentially unlimited additions. The security of E1 is based on a natural decisional version of the closest vector problem for ideal lattices for ideals in a fixed ring.
E1 is homomorphic only for shallow circuits because the "error" vector grows with addition and (especially) multiplication operations; eventually, it becomes so long that it causes a decryption error. It is natural to ask: can we "refresh" a ciphertext whose error vector is almost too long to obtain a new ciphertext whose error vector is shorter? Obviously, we could refresh a ciphertext if we could completely decrypt it! This is the idea behind bootstrapping: we do decrypt the ciphertext, but homomorphically! Specifically, suppose E is bootstrappable with plaintext space P is {0, 1}, and that circuits are boolean. Suppose we have a ciphertext ψ1 that encrypts π under pk 1 , which we want to refresh. So that we can decrypt it homomorphically, suppose we also have sk1, the secret key for pk 1 , encrypted under a second public key pk 2 : let sk1j be the encrypted secret key bits. Consider the following algorithm.
Recrypt E (pk 2 , DE , sk1j , ψ1).
Above, Evaluate takes in the bits of sk1 and ψ1, each encrypted under pk 2 . Then, E is used to evaluate the decryption circuit homomorphically. The output ψ2 is thus an encryption under pk 2 of Decrypt E (sk1, ψ1) = π.
2 Applying the decryption circuit DE removes the error vector associated to the first ciphertext, but EvaluateE simultaneously introduces a new error vector. Intuitively, we have made progress as long as the second error vector is shorter.
Suppose CE contains not just DE but also the augmentation of DE by NAND (i.e., a NAND gate connecting two copies of DE ). Then, we say E is bootstrappable.
Theorem 1 (Informal).
One can construct a (semantically secure) family {E (d) } of leveled fully homomorphic encryption schemes from any (semantically secure) bootstrappable encryption scheme E .
E
(d) 's public key contains d + 1 E public keys, basically one for each level of the circuit, and an acyclic chain of encrypted secret keys. It evaluates a d-depth NAND-circuit as follows: given ciphertexts encrypted under pk i associated to wires at the ith level of the circuit, it Recrypts them so that they become encrypted under pk i−1 , applies the NAND gates at that level, and recurses for i − 1. If E securely encrypts key-dependent messages (is KDM-secure) [9, 24, 12] -i.e., roughly, if providing a ciphertext that encrypts a function of the secret key does not hurt security -then the E public keys need not be distinct; we can have a "loop," even a "selfloop," of encrypted secret keys, and the derived scheme is fully homomorphic. See Section 2 for formal details.
In Section 4, we describe a scheme E2 that "tweaks" E1, analyze the complexity of its decryption circuit, and explain why we are unable to prove that it is bootstrappable. In Section 5, we describe a transformation of E2, labeled E3, where the E3 public key contains a set of vectors with a secret sparse subset whose sum is related to E2 secret key. This allows us to re-express decryption as a sparse subset vector sum rather than a full matrix-vector product, which requires a circuit of lower depth, permitting bootstrapping. It also entails an additional assumption: roughly, that it is hard to distinguish a set that has a sparse subset with a known sum from a set that is uniform. Similar assumptions have been analyzed in connection with server-aided decryption.
Theorem 2 (Informal). E3 is bootstrappable and is semantically secure (under two assumptions).
Other Related Work
Homomorphic encryption schemes that are not semantically secure, like basic RSA, may also have stronger attacks on their one-wayness. Boneh and Lipton [13] proved that any algebraic privacy homomorphism over a ring Zn can be broken in sub-exponential time under a (reasonable) number theoretic assumption, if the scheme is deterministic or otherwise offers an equality oracle. See also [35] and [18] .
Goldwasser and Micali [23] proposed the first semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme (and also introduced the notion of semantic security). Their scheme is "additively homomorphic" over Z2; in our terminology, its set CE of permitted circuits contains circuits with XOR gates. Other additively homomorphic encryption schemes with proofs of semantic security are Benaloh [8] , NaccacheStern [42] , Okamoto-Uchiyama [46] , Paillier [47] , and DamgardJurik [19] . Some additively homomorphic encryption schemes use lattices or linear codes [22, 50, 27, 36, 37, 4] . ElGamal [20] is multiplicatively homomorphic.
Semantically secure schemes that allow both addition and multiplication include Boneh-Goh-Nissim [11] (quadratic formulas) and "Polly Cracker" by Fellows and Koblitz [21, 29, 30, 31] (arbitrary circuits but with exponential ciphertextsize blow-up). Sanders, Young and Yung [56, 7] (SYY) use circuit-private additively homomorphic encryption to construct a circuit-private scheme that can handle NC1 circuits. Ishai and Paskin [26] do this for branching programs, which covers NC1 circuits (by Barrington [6] ), and ciphertexts in their scheme are much shorter -proportional to the length of the branching program rather than its size, though the computation is proportional to the size.
BOOTSTRAPPABLE ENCRYPTION
To be bootstrappable, E needs to be able to evaluate not only its decryption circuit, which merely allows recryptions of the same plaintext, but also slightly augmented versions of it, so that we can perform nontrivial operations on plaintexts and make progress through a circuit.
Definition 4 (Augmented Decryption Circuit).
Let Γ be a set of gates with inputs and output in plaintext space P including the identity gate (input and output are the same). For gate g ∈ Γ, the g-augmented decryption circuit consists of a g-gate connecting multiple copies of DE (the number of copies equals the number of inputs to g), where DE takes a secret key and ciphertext as input formatted as elements of P (λ) . We denote the set of g-augmented decryption circuits, g ∈ Γ, by DE (Γ).
Definition 5 (Bootstrappable Encryption). Let CE be a set of circuits with respect to which E is homomorphic. We say that E is bootstrappable with respect to Γ if
For a family of schemes {E (d) } derived from E that we will define momentarily, we have the following theorems.
Theorem 3. Let E be bootstrappable with respect to a set of gates Γ. Then the family {E (d) } is leveled fully homomorphic (for circuits with gates in Γ). Note that Γ is arbitrary in Theorem 3. For example, each gate in Γ could be a circuit of (ANDs, ORs, NOTs) of depth m and fan-in 2; for this value of Γ, Theorem 3 implies the scheme correctly evaluates "normal" circuits of depth d · m. Now we specify the leveled fully homomorphic scheme. Let E be bootstrappable with respect to a set of gates Γ. For any integer d ≥ 1, we use E to construct a scheme
) that can handle all circuits of depth d with gates in Γ. When we refer to the level of a wire in C, we mean the level of the gate for which the wire is an input. We use the notation DE (Γ, δ) to refer to the set of circuits that equal a δ-depth circuit with gates in Γ augmented by DE (copies of DE become inputs to the δ-depth circuit).
Takes as input a security parameter λ and a positive integer d. For = (λ) as in Definition 4, it sets (ski, pk i )
where ski1, . . . , sk i is the representation of ski as elements of P. It outputs the secret key sk (d) ← sk0 and the public key pk
refer to the scheme using sk (δ) ← sk0 and pk
.
. Takes as input a public key pk (d) and a
. Takes as input a secret key sk (d) and a ciphertext ψ (which should be an encryption under pk 0 ). It outputs Decrypt E (sk0, ψ).
Takes as input a public key pk (δ) , a circuit C δ of depth at most δ with gates in Γ, and a tuple of input ciphertexts Ψ δ (where each input ciphertext should be under pk δ ). We assume that each wire in C δ connects gates at consecutive levels; if not, add identity gates to make it so. If δ = 0, it outputs Ψ0 and terminates. Otherwise, it does the following:
• Sets (
Takes as input a public key pk (δ) , a circuit C δ of depth at most δ with gates in Γ, and a tuple of input ciphertexts Ψ δ (where each input ciphertext should be under pk δ ). It augments C δ with DE ; call the resulting circuit C † δ−1 . Let Ψ † δ−1 be the tuple of ciphertexts formed by replacing each input ciphertext ψ ∈ Ψ δ by the tuple sk δj , ψj , where ψj ← Encrypt E (δ−1) (pk (δ−1) , ψj ) and the ψj's form the properly-formatted representation of ψ as elements of P. It outputs (
. Takes as input a public key pk (δ) , a tuple of input ciphertexts Ψ † δ (where each input ciphertext should be an output of Encrypt E (δ) ), and a circuit C † δ ∈ DE (Γ, δ +1). It sets C δ to be the sub-circuit of C † δ consisting of the first δ levels. It sets Ψ δ to be the induced input ciphertexts of C δ , where the ciphertext ψ (w) δ associated to wire w at level δ is set to EvaluateE (pk δ , C
is the sub-circuit of C † δ with output wire w, and Ψ (w) δ are the input ciphertexts for C
Regarding the computational complexity of Evaluate E (d) :
Theorem 5. For a circuit C of depth at most d and size s (defined here as the number of wires), the computational complexity of applying Evaluate E (d) to C is dominated by at most s · · d applications of Encrypt E and at most s · d applications of EvaluateE to circuits in DE (Γ), where is as in Definition 4.
As mentioned above, if E is KDM-secure, we can shorten the public key to include pk and and an encryption of sk under pk, a "self-loop" rather than an acyclic chain of encrypted secret keys.
3 This scheme is fully homomorphic, with security following from KDM-security, and correctness following from correctness of the above scheme.
AN INITIAL CONSTRUCTION
Our goal now is to construct an encryption scheme that is bootstrappable with respect to a universal set of gates Γ -e.g., where Γ includes NAND and the trivial gate. Here, we describe an initial attempt. In Section 4, we describe some tweaks to this construction and find that the decryption complexity is still too large to permit bootstrappability. We finally achieve bootstrappability in Section 5.
The Initial Construction, Abstractly
We start by describing our initial attempt simply in terms of rings and ideals; we bring in ideal lattices later. In our initial scheme E , we use a fixed ring R that is set appropriately according to a security parameter λ. We also use a fixed basis BI of a ideal I ⊂ R, and an algorithm IdealGen(R, BI ) that outputs public and secret bases B pk J and B sk J of some (variable) ideal J, such that I + J = R -i.e., I and J are relatively prime. (Actually, B sk J can be a basis of a (fractional) ideal that contains J, rather than of J.) We assume that if t ∈ R and BM is a basis for ideal M ⊂ R, then the value t mod BM is unique and can be computed efficiently -i.e., the coset t + M has a unique, efficiently-computable "distinguished representative" with respect to the basis BM . We use the notation R mod BM to denote the set of distinguished representatives of r + M over r ∈ R, with respect to the particular basis BM of M . We also use an algorithm Samp(x, BI , R, BJ ) that samples from the coset x + I.
In the scheme, Evaluate takes as input a circuit C whose gates perform operations modulo BI . For example, an AddB I gate in C takes two terms in R mod BI , and outputs a third term in R mod BI , which equals the sum of the first two terms modulo I. 3 Initially, we used E * (with the self-loop) and tried to prove KDM-security. Canetti [15] proposed the acyclic, leveled approach to make this unnecessary.
KeyGen(R, BI
Encrypt(pk, π). Takes as input the public key pk and plaintext π ∈ P. It sets ψ ← Samp(π, BI , R, B pk J ) and outputs ψ ← ψ mod B pk J . Decrypt(sk, ψ). Takes as input the secret key sk and a ciphertext ψ. It outputs
Evaluate(pk, C, Ψ). Takes as input the public key pk, a circuit C in some permitted set CE of circuits composed of AddB I and MultB I gates and a set of input ciphertexts Ψ. It invokes Add and Mult, given below, in the proper sequence to compute the output ciphertext ψ. (We will describe CE when we consider correctness below. If desired, one could use different arithmetic gates.)
Mult(pk, ψ1, ψ2). Outputs ψ1 × ψ2 mod B pk J . Now, let us consider correctness, which is a highly nontrivial issue in this paper. The following definitions provide structure for our analysis.
To begin, we observe that the scheme is actually using two different circuits. First, Evaluate takes a mod-BI circuit C as input. This circuit is implicitly applied to plaintexts. Second, Evaluate applies a circuit related to C, which we call the generalized circuit, to the ciphertexts; this circuit uses the ring operations (not modulo I).
Definition 6 (Generalized Circuit). Let C be a mod-BI circuit. We say generalized circuit g(C) of C is the circuit formed by replacing C's AddB I and MultB I operations with addition '+' and multiplication '×' in the ring R.
Here are a few more definitions relevant to Theorem 6 below, which concerns correctness.
Definition 7 (X Enc and X Dec ). Let X Enc be the image of Samp. Notice that all ciphertexts output by Encrypt are in X Enc + J. Let X Dec equal R mod B sk J , the distinguished representatives of cosets of J wrt the secret basis B sk J .
Definition 8 (Permitted Circuits). Let
In other words, CE is the set of mod-BI circuits that, when generalized, the output is always in X Dec if the inputs are in X Enc . (The value t will of course depend on C.) If CE ⊆ CE , we say that CE is a set of permitted circuits.
Definition 9. ψ is a valid ciphertext wrt E public key pk and permitted circuits CE if it equals Evaluate(pk, C, Ψ) for some C ∈ CE , where each ψ ∈ Ψ is in the image of Encrypt.
Theorem 6. Assume CE is a set of permitted circuits containing the identity circuit. E is correct for CE -i.e., Decrypt correctly decrypts valid ciphertexts.
Proof. For Ψ = {ψ1, . . . , ψt}, ψ k = π k + i k + j k , where π k ∈ P, i k ∈ I, j k ∈ J, and π k + i k ∈ X Enc , we have
as required.
The bottom line is that we have proven that E is correct for permitted circuits, and our goal now is to maximize this set. The permitted circuits are defined somewhat indirectly; they are the circuits for which the "error" g(C)(x1, . . . , xt) of the output ciphertext is small (i.e., lies inside X Dec ) when the input ciphertexts are in the image of Encrypt E . When we begin to instantiate the abstract scheme with lattices and give geometric interpretations of X Enc and X Dec , the problem of maximizing CE will have a geometric flavor.
Security of the Abstract Construction
For an abstract "instantiation" of Samp that we describe momentarily, we provide a simple proof of semantic security based on the following abstract problem. Basically the ICP asks one to decide whether t is uniform modulo J, or whether it was chosen according to a known "clumpier" distribution induced by Samp 1 .
To get a proof based on the ICP, define Samp as follows. Let s ∈ I be such that the ideal (s) is relatively prime to J. (Assume for now that such an s can be efficiently generated.)
Obviously, the output is in x + I since s ∈ I. The value s could be a fixed parameter wired into the algorithm Samp, or generated dynamically from BI and B pk J according to a prescribed distribution. Proof. The challenger sends B a ICP instance (t, B pk J ). B sets s, and sets the other components of pk in the obvious way using the ICP instance. When A requests a challenge ciphertext on one of π0, π1 ∈ P, B sets a bit β R ← {0, 1} and sends back ψ ← π β + t × s mod B pk J . A sends back a guess β , and B guesses b ← β ⊕ β .
If b = 0, we claim that B's simulation is perfect; in particular, the challenge ciphertext has the correct distribution. When b = 0, we have that t = r + j, where r was chosen according to Samp 1 and j ∈ J. So, ψ ← π β + t × s = π β + r × s mod B pk J ; the ciphertext is thus well-formed. In this case A should have advantage , which translates into an advantage of for B.
If b = 1, then t is uniformly random modulo J. Since the ideal (s) is relatively prime to J, t × s is uniformly random modulo J, and consequently ψ is a uniformly random element of R mod B pk J that is independent of β. In this case A's advantage is 0. Overall, B's advantage is /2.
Background on Ideal Lattices
is monic and of degree n. We view an element v ∈ R both as a ring element and as a vector -specifically, the coefficient vector v ∈ Z n . The ideal (v) generated by v directly corresponds to the lattice generated by the column vectors {v × x i mod f (x) : i ∈ [0, n − 1]}; we call this the rotation basis of the ideal lattice (v). Generally speaking, an ideal I ⊂ R need not be principal -i.e., have a single generator -and a basis BI of I need not be a rotation basis. R corresponds to the ideal (1) or (e1), and to Z n . The Hermite normal form (HNF) of a lattice I is an upper triangular basis that can be efficiently computable from any other basis of I, making it well-suited to be a public key [39] . The index [R : I] equals | det(BI )|; since this is invariant, we refer to det(I).
As required by our abstract scheme, for any basis BI of an ideal I ⊆ R, the term t mod BI is uniquely defined as the vector t ∈ P(BI) such that t − t ∈ I, where P(BI ) is the half-open parallelepiped P(B) ← { n i=1 xibi : xi ∈ [−1/2, 1/2)}. The vector t mod BI is efficiently computable as t − B · B −1 · t , where · rounds the coefficients of a vector to the nearest integer. We define the length BI of a basis to be max{ bi : bi ∈ BI }.
Cryptographic work on ideal lattices includes NTRU [25] and more recent work [41, 32, 33, 48, 49] .
The Initial Construction, Concretely
When we implement the abstract construction using a polynomial ring and ideal lattices as described in Section 3.3, the sets X Enc and X Dec become subsets of Z n . We recharacterize these sets geometrically as follows.
Definition 11 (r Enc and r Dec ). Let r Enc be the smallest value such that X Enc ⊆ B(r Enc ), where B(r) is the ball of radius r. Let r Dec be the largest such that X Dec ⊇ B(r Dec ). Now, let us define a set of permitted circuits CE as follows:
CE is defined like the maximal set CE of permitted circuits in Definition 8, but we have replaced X Enc and X Dec with B(r Enc ) and B(r Dec ). Clearly, CE ⊆ CE . (At several points later in the paper, we narrow our set of permitted circuits again so as to enable a less complex decryption algorithm.) For fixed values of r Enc and r Dec , what is CE ? This is a geometric problem, and we can bound the Euclidean length g(C)(x1, . . . , xt) by bounding the lengths of u + v and u × v in terms of u and v . For addition, this is easy: using the triangle inequality, we have u + v ≤ u + v for u, v ∈ R. For multiplication, we can prove that u × v ≤ γ Mult (R) · u · v , where γ Mult (R) is some factor that is dependent only on the ring R. (See [32] for a different definition of the expansion factor for multiplication.)
The following theorem characterizes the "error expansion" that a circuit can cause based on the circuit's depth. Theorem 8. Suppose r E ≥ 1 and that circuit C's additive fan-in is γ Mult (R), multiplicative is 2, and depth is at most log log r D − log log(γ Mult (R) · r E ) Then, C(x1, . . . , xt) ∈ B(r D ) for all x1, . . . , xt ∈ B(r E ).
Proof. For a d-depth circuit, let ri be an upper-bound on the Euclidean norm of the values at level i, given that r d = r E . By the triangle inequality, an addition (or subtraction) gate at level i outputs some v ∈ R such that v ≤ γ Mult (R)· ri. A multiplication gate at level i outputs some v ∈ R such that v ≤ γ Mult (R) · r An (oversimplified) bottom line from Theorem 8 is that, to maximize the depth of circuits that E can correctly evaluate (see Theorem 6), we should minimize γ Mult (R) and r Enc , and maximize r Dec . Most of the remainder of this subsection consists of proposals toward this goal.
First, though, we observe that semantic security places a limit on how large we can take r Dec /r Enc . In concrete terms, the ICP becomes (roughly): decide whether t is within a small distance (less than r Enc ) of the lattice J (according to a distribution determined by Samp 1 ), or is uniformly random modulo J. This is a fairly natural decisional version of the closest vector problem, though we are unaware of an equivalent problem mentioned in the literature. Certainly r Dec < λ1(J), the latter being the length of the shortest nonzero vector in J. On other hand, we cannot let λ1(J)/r Enc be too large (e.g., 2 n ); otherwise, lattice reduction techniques, such as LLL [28, 5, 57] , make it feasible to recover the J-vector closest to t, which breaks the ICP. However, given known attacks, this problem is infeasible for a 2 n c approximation factor when c < 1. Overall, the ratio r Dec /r Enc can also be sub-exponential. When r Dec = 2 n c 1 and
n c 2 , then Theorems 6 and 8 imply that the scheme can correctly evaluate circuits of depth (c1−c2) log n.
Regarding γ Mult (R), there are many f for which γ Mult (R) is only polynomial in n:
As an example, f (x) = x n ±1 achieves γ Mult (R) = √ n. Aside from Theorem 9, we do not specify how to choose R; let us assume it is chosen so that γ Mult (R) is polynomial in n.
Regarding r Enc , recall that X Enc ⊆ B(r Enc ) is the image of Samp, where our security proof (Theorem 7) holds when Samp(x, BI , R, B pk J ) runs r ← Samp 1 (R) and outputs x + r × s, where s ∈ I and the ideal (s) is relatively prime to J. For simplicity, suppose that I is the principal ideal (s). Let be an upper bound on the length of r, drawn according to Samp 1 . We have
Toward minimizing r Enc , we can choose s to be short -e.g., use s = 2 · e1. The size of is a security issue. We need it to be large enough so that the min-entropy of t mod B pk J in the ICP is large; taking to be polynomial in n suffices. Overall, we can take r Enc to be polynomial in n. We note that, even in this case, the plaintext space may be as large as [R : I] = det(I), which can be exponential in n. Now, r Dec , as the radius of the largest sphere centered at 0 that is circumscribed by B sk J , obviously depends crucially on the secret basis. The important property of B sk J is its shape -i.e., we want the parallelepiped P(B sk J ) to be "fat" enough to contain a large sphere. This property is easier to formalize in terms of the inverse matrix (B T . Let r be the radius of the largest sphere, centered at 0, circumscribed by P(B) (permitting tangential overlap). Then, r = 1/(2 · B * ). In particular,
Suppose t < r; then each coefficient of B −1 · t has magnitude at most 1/2.
Proof. Each coefficient of B −1 · t is an inner product of t with a column vector of B * , and therefore has magnitude at most t · B * < 1/2. This implies B −1 · t = 0, and thus t = (t mod B), and thus t ∈ P(B). Let v be the longest vector in B * , and let x be parallel to v. Then,
It is easy to imagine ad hoc ways of instantiating IdealGen -e.g., one could generate a random vector v and simply set B sk J to be the rotation basis of v, and set B pk J to be the HNF of (v). Very roughly speaking, if v is generated as a vector that is very "nearly parallel" to e1 (i.e., the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0)), then the rotational basis will have r Dec within a small factor of v /2. This method can be made to ensure that r Dec is within a polynomial factor of λ1(J).
On the other hand, one may prefer to generate J according to a "nice" average-case distribution that permits a worstcase / average-case reduction [1, 2, 53] . This is a technical issue that we tackle in a separate work. We stress that our analysis below regarding the decryption circuit does not rely on any of the concrete proposals in this subsection -e.g., the analysis does not require I to be a principal ideal.
BOOTSTRAPPABLE YET?
Here, we describe two "tweaks" to the scheme to lower the decryption complexity in preparation for bootstrapping; we label the tweaked scheme E2. Next, we analyze the decryption complexity (and find that it is too large). However, some of the analysis applies to the final scheme.
We separate E2 from E1 because the former already improves upon previous work, irrespective of bootstrapping. The Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) pairing-based cryptosystem [11] was the first to permit efficient evaluation of quadratic formulas that may have an arbitrary number of monomials. However, BGN has a small plaintext space -log λ bits for security parameter λ. E1 allows both greater multiplicative depth in the circuit (while allowing essentially an arbitrary number of additions) and also a larger plaintext space.
Some Tweaks to the Initial Construction
In each of the following tweaks, we slightly narrow our set of permitted circuits CE . Recall from Section 3.4 that E1's definition of CE used B(r Enc ) and B(r Dec ).
Tweak 1: Redefine the set of permitted circuits CE , replacing B(r Dec ) with B(r Dec /2). Proof. Observe that ψ ∈ B(r Dec /2)+J. Let ψ = x+j for x ∈ B(r Dec /2) and j ∈ J. We have (B
Recall that
−1 · j, where the former term has coefficients of magnitude at most 1/4 by Lemma 1 and the latter is an integer vector.
Per Theorem 8, the new maximum evaluation depth of the scheme after Tweak 1 is log log(r Dec /2) − log log(γ Mult (R) · r Enc ), which is less than the original amount by only a subconstant additive factor.
Tweak 2 is more technical and less "essential" than the first tweak. It replaces matrix-vector multiplications with ring multiplications. This is nice, but the two computations are essentially equally parallelizable, and their circuits have essentially the same depth. So, really, this tweak is primarily useful for reducing the public key size and the per-gate computation during bootstrapping in our ultimate scheme. 
To use both tweaks, we need to reduce the radius of the sphere in Tweak 2 by an additional factor of 2.
Tweak 2 requires us to reduce the permitted distance of ciphertexts from the J-lattice much more than Tweak 1. Still, it does not affect our maximum evaluation depth very much when γ Mult (R) and BI are polynomial in n, and r Dec /r Enc is super-polynomial.
The following two lemmas say that we can perform Tweak 2 efficiently and that it has the expected effect -i.e., the new Decrypt equation works correctly. 
Lemma 4. Suppose ψ is a valid ciphertext after Tweak 2 which decrypts to π. Then,
Decryption Complexity of Tweaked Scheme
To decrypt, we compute is a rotation matrix. We split the decryption computation into the following sequence of steps:
Step 1: Generate n vectors with sum B sk2 J · ψ
Step 2: From the n vectors x1, . . . , xn, generate integer vectors y1, . . . , yn+1 with sum xi .
Step 1, to obtain the n vectors, we perform the multiplications associated to the inner products associated to the matrix-vector multiplication; we do not discuss this step in detail, since (we will find that) Step 2 is already too expensive to permit bootstrappability.
Regarding
Step 2, recall that Evaluate takes as input circuits with mod-BI gates -i.e., arithmetic gates whose inputs and outputs are in R mod BI . However, in general "base-BI ," it is unclear how to handle the carries needed for adding the vectors in Step 2 without resorting to highdegree polynomials that require more multiplicative depth that our initial construction can evaluate. To handle this complication, we use the plaintext space P = {0, 1} mod BI , regardless of the underlying ideal I. We emulate boolean operations, where carries are constant-depth. (This plaintext space restriction is unnecessary if we use the initial construction without bootstrapping.) We have the following lemma.
be a real number given in binary representation mod BI with the promise that i ai mod 1 ∈ [−1/4, 1/4]. There is a mod-BI circuit C for generating t + 1 integers z1, . . . , zt+1 (also represented in binary) whose sum is i ai , such that if the generalized circuit g(C)'s inputs are in B(rin), then its outputs are in B(rout) for:
For BI ≤ rin, t ≤ n, and γ Mult (R) = n Ω(1) , we have:
Proof (fragment). Let a * i be the integer part of ai and let a † i = (ai,−1, ai,−2, . . .) be the fractional part. Let T = log t + 2. Let bi = (a † i,−1 , . . . , a † i,−T ). First, we claim that a † i = bi . This claim follows from the promise that i a † i is within 1/4 of an integer, and that
Our t + 1 output integers will be a * 1 , . . . , a * t , bi . Our strategy for computing bi is first to compute, for each j ∈ [1, T ], the binary representation cj of the Hamming weight of (b1,−j , . . . , bt,−j). Then, we finish by computing the sum T j=1 2 −j · cj ; this latter term is much easier to compute than the original term, since it only consists of T numbers, rather than t.
This strategy is straightforward when I = (2 · e1) and the plaintext space is {0, 1} mod I. The binary representation of the Hamming weight of (b1, . . . , bt) is given by (e 2 log t (b1, . . . , bt) mod 2, . . . , e 2 0 (b1, . . . , bt) mod 2) where ei(x1, . . . , xt) is the ith elementary symmetric polynomial over x1, . . . , xt. (See Lemma 4 of [14] .) These polynomials can be computed in time poly(t), and the fact that rout is exponential in t comes from the fact that the degree of these polynomials is upper bounded by t. There are minor complications when I = (2 · e1) (omitted). Unfortunately, Step 2 uses t = n, implying r Dec /r Enc ≥ rout/rin ≥ 2 n , and therefore the above analysis cannot show that the initial construction is both bootstrappable and secure. However, Lemma 5 will be relevant to our final scheme, as will the following lemma regarding Step 3:
Lemma 6. Using a constant depth circuit having polynomial fan-in AddB I gates and constant fan-in MultB I gates, we can compute ψ − B sk1 J · ( yi) mod BI from a binary representation (using the bits {0, 1} mod BI ) of the terms of the expression.
The proof of Lemma 6 involves converting the binary representation of the terms to a more "natural" mod-BI representation, at which point the computation is trivially obviously constant depth. As a toy example for intuition, suppose we have mod-13 gates, where the numbers 0, . . . , 12 are represented by 13 different "frequencies" (not in terms of a binary representation), and Add13 and Mult13 perform addition and multiplication modulo 13 "automatically." To obtain the natural representation of r mod 13 as one of the 13 frequencies given the binary representation ...b1b0 (each bit in {0, 1} mod 13), we precompute the aj ← 2 j mod 13 and output Add13(..., Mult13(a1, b1), Mult13(a0, b0)). This takes constant depth even if r has a polynomial number of bits using polynomial-fan-in Add13 gates. Essentially the same considerations apply in the proof of Lemma 6. The simplest case is where I = (2) and the conversion is unnecessary.
SQUASHING THE DEC. CIRCUIT
The circuit complexity of decryption in E2 is too high to permit bootstrapping. The culprit is Step 2 -i.e., adding n numbers. Here, we describe how transform the scheme so that Decrypt adds only a sub-linear quantity of numbers. Importantly, this transformation does not affect the set of permitted circuits at all. However, the transformation does induce an additional hardness assumption. By choosing parameters appropriately, the scheme becomes bootstrappable.
The Transformation, Abstractly
At a high level, our transformation works by splitting the initial decryption algorithm into two phases -an initial computationally intensive preprocessing phase performed without the secret key (by the encrypter), followed by a computationally lightweight phase using the secret key (by the decrypter). In short, the encrypter preprocesses its own initial ciphertext, leaving less work for the decrypter to do. Interestingly, this two-phase approach to decryption is precisely what one finds in server aided cryptography.
In detail, let E * be an initial encryption scheme (which concretely will become E2). From E * , we construct a modified scheme E that uses two new algorithms, SplitKey E and ExpandCT E , that will remain abstract for now.
The secret key is sk. The public key pk is (pk * , τ ).
Encrypt E (pk, π). Runs ψ * ← Encrypt E * (pk * , π). It then sets ψ to include ψ * and the output of ExpandCT E (pk, ψ * ). (ExpandCT E makes heavy use of tag τ .)
Decrypt E (sk, ψ). Uses sk and the expanded ciphertext to decrypt more efficiently. Decrypt E (sk, ψ) should work whenever Decrypt E * (sk * , ψ * ) works.
, and outputs ψ which includes ψ * and the output of ExpandCT E (pk, ψ * ). MultE (pk, ψ1, ψ2) is analogous.
The security of the transformation relies on the following problem, which is completely abstract at this point.
Definition 12 (SplitKey Distinguishing Problem).
The challenger sets (sk * , pk * )
, where ⊥ is a special symbol. The problem: guess b given (τ, sk * , pk * ).
Theorem 10. Suppose that there is an algorithm A that breaks the semantic security of E above with advantage . Then, there exist algorithms B0 and B1, running in about the same time as A, such that either B0's advantage against the SplitKey Distinguishing Problem or B1's advantage against the semantic security of E * is at least /3.
The Transformation, Concretely
Let (sk * , pk * ) be an E2 key pair. Let γset(n) and γ subset (n) be functions, where the former is ω(n) and poly(n) and the latter is ω(1) and o(n). Here are the concrete instantiations SplitKey E , ExpandCT E , and Decrypt E used to construct E3. • τ is a set of γset(n) vectors t1, . . . , t γset(n) that are uniformly random in J −1 mod BI , except there exists a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , γset(n)} of cardinality γ subset (n) such that i∈S ti ∈ v sk * J + I.
• sk is a matrix γ subset (n) × γset(n) matrix M of 0's and 1's, where Mij = 1 iff j is the ith member of S.
ExpandCT E (pk, ψ * ). Outputs ci ← ti × ψ * mod BI for i ∈ [1, γset(n)]. These terms are represented in binary using {0, 1} mod BI , as in E2.
Decrypt E (sk, ψ). Takes as input the secret key sk and a ciphertext ψ. It performs the following steps:
Step 0: Set the vectors wij ← Mij · cj Step 1: Set the vectors xi ← γset(n) j=1 wij
Step 2: From γ subset (n) vectors x1, . . . , xn, generate integer vectors y1, . . . , y γ subset (n)+1 with sum xi .
into τ , which is a set of vectors with a hidden sparse subset whose sum is v sk * J modulo I, and sk, which is a set of incidence matrix encoding the subset. To generate τ , one may, for example, just set t1, . . . , t γset (n)−1 to be uniformly random vectors in
ti mod BI . Then one permutes the vectors.
In Decrypt E , Steps 2 and 3 are as in E2 (Section 4), with the crucial difference that Step 2 adds only γ subset (n) vectors. In Steps 0 and 1, Decrypt E sets xi to be the γ subset (n) "relevant" vectors in {ci} -i.e., the ones associated to the subset. Correctness should be clear.
Without Tweak 2, we could have instead used a γset(n)-sized set of matrices with a hidden γ subset (n)-sized subset whose sum is related to (B sk J ) −1 . This would have resulted in a larger public key.
Bootstrapping Achieved
We analyzed Steps 2 and 3 in Section 4.2. It is obvious that Step 0 requires only constant depth. We claim that
Step 1 requires only constant depth, but why? Computing
wij is very cheap because, in the set {wij : j ∈ [1, γset(n)}, there is only one nonzero vector. Therefore, when we add the vectors, no expensive carry operations are required; we simply "XOR" the vectors together using polynomial-fan-in AddB I operations, using constant depth. At last, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 11. The scheme E3 is bootstrappable when
where m arises from the re-definition of CE in the Tweaks (m = 2 when just Tweak 1 is used), α > 1 is chosen so that (α − 1) · γ subset (n) is greater than the polylog(γ subset (n)) term coming from Lemma 5, and c is a constant representing the depth needed in a circuit having AddB I gates with γ Mult (R) = n Ω(1) fan-in and MultB I gates with constant fanin to sequentially perform Decrypt E Steps 0, 1, 3, and 4, and a NAND gate. have that if the inputs to our generalized NAND-augmented decryption circuit are in B(r Enc ), the output is in
The result follows when this value is at most r Dec /m.
For example, suppose γ Mult (R) · r Enc is polynomial in n, and r Dec = 2 n C for C < 1. In this case, γ subset (n) can be polynomial in n (but sub-linear). The constant c is not very large, though in practice one would want to optimize it beyond what we have done.
On the New Hardness Assumption
Concretely, the SplitKey Distinguishing Problem becomes:
Definition 13 (SplitKey DP, concrete version). Let γset(n) and γ subset (n) be functions as above, and BI a basis of an ideal I. The challenger sets (sk * , pk * )
This problem is related to the following problem, which has been analyzed in connection with server-aided cryptography [34, 51, 44, 38, 43] , and which should not be confused with the low-density knapsack problem [45] .
Definition 14 (Sparse Subset Sum Problem (SSSP)).
Let γset(n) and γ subset (n) be functions as above. Let q be a positive integer. The challenger sets b R ← {0, 1}. If b = 0 it generates τ as a set of γset(n) integers {a1, . . . , a γset(n) } in [−q/2, q/2] that are uniformly random, except that there exists a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , γset(n)} of cardinality γ subset (n) such that i∈S ai = 0 mod q. If b = 1, it sets the elements without the constraint. The problem: guess b given τ .
Known attacks on the SSSP [51, 44, 38, 43] are feasible only for limited choices of parameters. Some of these [51] (and previous related results [58, 17] ) essentially amount to a time-space tradeoff whose complexity is γset(n) O(γ subset (n)) ; these only require us to take γ subset (n) = ω(1). Nguyen and Shparlinski [43] present a lattice-based cryptanalysis of the SSSP that provably succeeds with advantage at least 1 − (γ subset (n) γset(n)+2 · α)/q where α is a term that is greater than 1. The attack breaks down when γset(n) exceeds log q. Though we omit details, current attacks against our concrete version SplitKey DP begin to break down when γset(n) exceeds log det(IJ). The intuition is that, once γset(n) is sufficiently large, there will be exponentially many subsets in τ (not necessarily sparse) whose vector sum is congruent to v sk * J ; lattice reduction techniques have trouble extracting the sparse subset from among the many subset solutions.
PERFORMANCE
Our scheme relies on two assumptions. The first assumption underlies the security E1 and its approximation factor is mildly impacted by the tweaks of E2. The second arises from the addition of τ to the public key. Interestingly, the two assumptions counterbalance each other: increasing γ subset (n) seems to make the second problem harder, but at the expense of increasing the approximation factor in the first problem, making the first problem easier.
Using a crude analysis, the breaking time for the second problem using known attacks is roughly 2 γ subset (n) . (We ignore constants and logarithmic factors in the exponent.) The approximation factor for the first problem is also roughly 2 γ subset (n) . Using the rule of thumb that a lattice problem for approximation factor 2 k takes time about 2 n/k , the breaking time for the first problem is roughly 2 n/γ subset (n) . Setting γ subset (n) ← √ n maximizes the minimal breaking time at about 2 √ n . To make this breaking time truly exponential in the security parameter λ, we need n ≈ λ 2 . For each gate, we evaluate the circuit DE homomorphically. (Actually, there is a tradeoff here, since a "gate" can be taken to be a "normal circuit" of depth greater than 1.) Though it is a shallow circuit, the computational complexity of DE itself in E3 (not evaluated homomorphically in the encryption scheme) is quite high (but poly(λ)), primarily due to the large unary representation of the secret key in E3. The fact that decryption is performed homomorphically, with ciphertext elements in R mod B pk J being used instead of plaintext elements in R mod BI , multiplies the complexity by another factor that is quasi-linear in n · γ subset (n), since roughly log det(IJ) ≈ n · log r Dec /r Enc ≈ n · γ subset (n) bits of precision are needed, but again this is polynomial in λ. Two optimizations are: 1) one can reduce the size of the E3 secret key substantially by allowing a modest increase in the depth of the decryption circuit, and 2) the homomorphic decryption circuit can take the ciphertext bits as input directly [15] (rather than the encrypted ciphertext bits). Making the full scheme practical remains an open problem (though E1 is quite practical for shallow circuits).
CIRCUIT PRIVACY
We omit full details due to lack of space, but mention that one can construct an algorithm RandomizeCTE for our E2 that can be applied to ciphertexts output by Encrypt E 2 and EvaluateE 2 , respectively, that induces equivalent output distributions. The circuit privacy of E2 immediately implies the (leveled) circuit privacy of our (leveled) fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
The idea is simple: to construct a random encryption ψ of π from a particular encryption ψ of π, we simply add an encryption of 0 that has a much larger random "error" vector than ψ -super-polynomially larger, so that the new error vector statistically obliterates all information about ψ's error vector. This entails another re-definition of CE .
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